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Abstract 
There exists an intense debate about the effects of corporate tax cuts on the formation of 
private capital in the real sector. This paper studies the investment impact of the effective 
fiscal burden of firms during the period 1995-2014. To this end, in a first step national 
accounts data is used to calculate backward looking average Effective Corporate Tax Rates 
(ECTR) for 73 developed and developing countries. In a second step, a dynamic panel 
approach is employed to estimate the impact of the ECTR on private gross fixed capital 
formation and foreign direct investment inflows. The obtained results indicate that: (i) ECTR 
not only tend to be much lower than statutory corporate tax rates, but also have different 
dynamics over time; and (ii) there exists no clear statistically significant negative 
relationship between ECTR and private investment. Instead, private capital formation and 
FDI inflows are rather explained by economic growth, the persistence of investment 
spending, trade openness, and the quality of institutions. This finding is robust when 
alternative effective corporate tax rate measures or statutory corporate tax rates are 
considered. 
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Investment expenditure is seen as a major determinant of economic growth (Keynes, 
1936; Harrod, 1939; Solow, 1956; Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962; Romer, 1986), and it is 
therefore common that governments employ policies that are aimed at stimulating domestic 
investment and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Among these policies are 
tax incentives for firms, given that conventional economic theories find that corporate 
taxation raises the cost of capital and thus affect its accumulation negatively (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958; Jorgenson, 1963; Chirinko, 2002; Bösenberg et al., 2018).  
Accordingly, many countries have substantially reduced their corporate tax rates in the 
last three decades (Abbas and Klemm, 2013; Dyreng et al., 2017). One prominent recent 
example is the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” by the Trump administration, which includes a 
statutory corporate tax reduction by 14 percentage point (from 35% to 21%), among other 
favorable provisions for firms, and has the explicit aim to foster investment from domestic 
and foreign firms. 
However, instead of being used for physical investment, rising profits often are used for 
financial investment, mergers and acquisitions, debt reductions or share buy-backs; this is 
especially true in the recent era of financialisation (Froud et al., 2001; Stockhammer, 2004; 
2008; van Treeck, 2009; Tori and Onaran, 2018).3 Furthermore, tax cuts tend to reduce the 
revenue of governments, which in turn can affect negatively the provision of public goods 
that have a complementary function with private investment, such as infrastructure, R&D 
and education (Aschauer, 1989; Corsetti & Roubini, 1996). Additionally, tax cuts can lead to 
fiscal deficits, which can translate into higher interest rates that raise the opportunity costs of 
capital formation (Gale & Orzag 2005).  
 
3 In line with this research, the FOMC (2017, pg. 6) states that the capital spending effect of the “Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act” is uncertain because business survey respondents “noted that the increase in cash flow that would 
result from corporate tax cuts was more likely to be used for mergers and acquisitions or for debt reduction 
and stock buybacks”.  
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All of these factors can limit the potential positive effect of corporate tax reductions on 
physical investment spending, and explain why survey responses4 and the results of empirical 
studies on this matter are mixed. With regard to the latter, approximately 60% of the cross-
country literature that we reviewed find a statistically significant and robust negative impact 
of the tax burden on inward FDI, while only approximately 35% find the same result in the 
case of fixed capital formation (see Section 2 for details).  
To measure the tax burden of firms (and housheholds), four approaches are commonly 
used. The first approach is to consider statutory corporate income tax rates (CIT), tax 
incentives (like tax credits and deductions) and depreciation and inventory valuation rules 
that are reported in the national tax codes. The second approach is to calculate forward 
looking effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) on hypothetical investment projects, 
considering all available information from tax codes. The third approach is to derive an 
effective average tax rate (EATR) by considering the ratio between the net present value of 
tax payments (including personal taxes on interest income and capital gains) and the net 
present value of pre-tax capital income.5 The fourth approach is to calculate backward 
looking effective tax rates by considering the ratio between the tax payments and pre-tax 
profits that are reported in the balance sheets of firms (Micro-BL ETR), or by using the ratio 
between aggregate corporate tax revenues and pre-tax profits that are reported in the national 
accounts (Macro-BL ETR).  
Given the complex tax structures and the selective use of tax incentives, it is questionable 
if the reliance on national tax code information adequately captures the actual amount of tax 
incentives reaped by firms (including the shifting of profits to tax havens). Furthermore, tax 
code based measures are most appropriate when countries administer tax rates uniformly 
across firms, which is unlikely given that incentives are highly negotiable (Mutti and Grubert, 
2004). A further limitation of EMTR and EATR is that the calculation of capital costs 
requires detailed information that is not available for many countries, and that their 
 
4 For example, Lim et al. (2013) examines tax expert surveys from the National Tax Association in the USA 
and finds that only approximately 50% of the respondents believe that capital gains tax cuts boost investment. 
World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency survey survey shows that only 29% of the largest 
transnational firms consider national taxes as an important factor in investing in a location (MIGA, 2002), and 
Wunder (2001) finds that only 4 out of 75 surveyed Fortune 500 companies consider fiscal factors as crucial to 
deciding on what location to invest 
5 Please see Devereux & Griffith (2003) for details on how EMTR and EATR are derived. 
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aggregation is difficult because they are calculated for specific investment projects, with 
specific rates of return and methods of finance (Devereux, 2007). 
Although backward looking effective tax rates are far from perfect, they have the 
advantage that profit and revenue data captures the sum of all tax incentive and elusions 
schemes that are effectively employed.6 However, Micro-BL ETR data typically is only 
available for OECD countries, whereas the national accounts data that is necessary to 
calculate Macro-BL ETR is also available for many developing countries. That is to say, of 
the potential corporate tax burden measures Macro-BL ETR are the easiest to compute, with 
the most broadly available data, and probably are the most consistent in a cross-country 
setting.  
A shortcoming of the existing studies that are using Macro-BL ETR is that they consider 
the jointly taxation of corporate profits and household capital income, which means that there 
is a gap in the literature regarding the magnitude and evolution of Macro-BL corporate ETR 
and their impact on investment. This paper tries to close this gap by providing new evidence 
on the existing effective corporate tax burden and its effect on private investment by: (i) 
calculating Macro-BL based average effective corporate tax rates (ECTR) for 73 developed 
and developing countries for the period 1995-2014, and (ii) establishing empirically whether 
changes in ECTR affect the inflow of FDI and private gross private fixed capital formation 
(PGFCF). 
The main findings of this exercise are: (i) ECTR not only tend to be much lower than 
statutory corporate tax rates, but also have different dynamics over time; and (ii) there exists 
no clear statistically significant negative relationship between ECTR and private investment. 
Instead, the dynamic panel models indicate that private capital formation and FDI inflows 
are rather explained by economic growth, the persistence of investment spending, trade 
openness, and the quality of institutions. This finding is robust when alternative effective 
corporate tax rate measures or statutory corporate tax rates are considered for a reduced 
sample size. 
 
6 Backward looking “tax liabilities of a firm at any point in time reflects (i) the history of its investment up to 
that point (in determining what allowances it can claim in that period) (ii) tax liabilities in possibly several 
jurisdictions, (iii) the history of losses in the firm (that is, it may be carrying forward losses from some previous 
period), and (iv) the history of the tax system up to that point” (Devereux, 2007: 18) 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses briefly 
the results from the empirical literature that has tried to measures the impact of the tax burden 
on investment in cross-country settings. The third section details the methodology used for 
calculating ECTR and to establish empirically their impact on PGFCF and FDI inflows. The 
fourth section presents the obtained results, and the fifth section draws conclusions. 
2. Existing empirical cross-country evidence on the impact of taxation on investment 
A wide range of empirical studies has tried to corroborate the predictions of theoretical 
models that corporate taxes have a negative impact on inward FDI and fixed capital 
formation. These studies have used various methodologies in terms of how to measure the 
tax burden as well as how to determine its impact on investment.  
As mentioned above, the results of these studies are rather mixed. We have reviewed 20 
articles that either measure the impact of taxation on fixed capital formation, inward FDI or 
both. The summary of Table 1 shows that out of the thirteen studies that measure the impact 
of corporate taxation on inward FDI, only eight (62%) report a robust significant negative 
impact. In the case of (private) capital formation, this figure even drops to four out of eleven 
(36%). 
Table 1 also shows that the articles vary widely in terms of the used tax and investment 
measures, methodology, and time period. Moreover, most studies concentrate on high-
income OECD countries, whereas few studies use a mixed sample of developed countries 
and emerging markets (EM) or concentrate solely on EM.  
The divergence in country coverage might explain in part the mixed findings. For 
example, Klemm and Van Parys (2012: 420) find that “in Latin America and the Caribbean 
lowering the tax rate or extending tax holidays help to attract FDI, but not in Africa”, while 
Lim (2014: 174) concludes that a for developing countries as a whole “favorable investment 
climate is characterized not so much by traditional policy areas [like tax incentives] but more 
by the broader institutional environment in which firms operate”. However, even when 
studies consider (the same) OECD countries and similar time periods their results differ 
substantially. Hence, they seem sensitive to the use of different tax and investment measures 




Table 1: Summary of the cross-country evidence on the impact of taxation 
on investment 
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The remainder of this paper contributes to the existing literature by providing a new 
Macro-BL average effective corporate tax rate measure (ECTR) for a broad sample of 73 
developing and developed countries, and by estimating the impact of this measure on PGFCF 
and FDI inflows for a more recent time period (1995-2014) than previous studies.   
3. Research Design 
This paper proposes a new approach to calculate backward looking effective corporate tax 
rates (ECTR), which intends to capture the average tax burden of corporations when they 
carry out their activity. More precisely, our ECTR measure relies on aggregate data of the 
systems of national accounts (SNA), and is based on the ratio between the taxes that 




  (1) 
where 𝑖𝑖 represents country, 𝑡𝑡 is time, 𝐷𝐷5𝐸𝐸 are current taxes on income and wealth paid by 
non-financial and financial corporations, 𝐷𝐷29 are other taxes paid on production by non-
financial and financial corporations8, and 𝐵𝐵2𝑔𝑔 is the gross operating surplus of non-financial 
and financial corporations. Please note that other taxes on production are added to the gross 
operating surplus because the SNA deducts them from the valued added when calculating 
the gross operating surplus (i.e. without these taxes the profit of corporations would be 
higher). 
Considering the publicly available SNA data of the United Nations and the OECD, we 
calculate yearly ECTR for an unbalanced sample of 73 countries during 1995-2014. The 
country sample consists of 36 high income, 20 upper-middle income and 17 lower-middle 
income countries (please see Appendix A for a detailed country list).  
 
7 This approach is in the spirit of Mendoza et al.’s (1997) Macro-BL capital income ETR, but does not consider 
personal capital income and tax payments as their measure does. 
8 Other taxes on production consist of taxes on payroll or work force (excluding social security contributions); 
on land, buildings or other structures; in order to obtain a license to carry on a particular kind of business or 
profession; on the use of vehicles or machinery and equipment; on legal procedures that are related to production 
purposes; on pollution; and on international transactions. 
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In line with the above-discussed literature, in a second step the following ad hoc dynamic 
panel model is used to estimate the impact of the ECTR on private investment: 
( 𝐼𝐼
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺
)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(
𝐼𝐼
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺
)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑧𝑧𝑋𝑋𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘−2𝑧𝑧=3 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (2) 
where 𝐼𝐼
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺
 is private investment as percentage of GDP (measured as FDI inflows or PGFCF), 
𝑋𝑋 is a vector of control variables, 𝜌𝜌 are fixed country effects that account for unexplained 
heterogeneity across countries, and 𝜇𝜇 is a random error term.9 ECTR is considered with a lag 
because it is likely that firms do not respond immediately to changes in the tax burden, while 
the lag of the dependent variable tries to capture the well-established correlation between 
current and past investment.  
The data for the dependent variables, net FDI inflows (as % of GDP) and gross fixed 
capital formation of the private sector (as % of GDP), are retrieved from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). For our purpose it would be preferable to use corporate gross 
fixed capital formation (CGFCF) instead of PGFCF (which includes fixed investments of 
private non-profit agencies) but unfortunately this measure is not available for most of the 
sample countries. 
In line with previous literature we use GDP growth, GDP per capita, inflation, trade 
openness, government expenditure and the rule of law as control variables. The rule of law 
data is taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), while the other variables 
are available in WDI. The GDP growth measure captures economic dynamics; it is expected 
that higher growth rates foster domestic investment and attract foreign investors (van Parys 
& James 2010b; Abbas & Klemm 2013; Lim 2014). GPD per capita is a proxy for the level 
of development. Higher development levels might foster investment but at the same time can 
also mean that investment returns are lower. Hence, both a negative or a positive sign are 
theoretically plausible (Razin et al., 2007; Klemm & van Parys, 2012). 
The inflation rate is considered on the grounds that high rates might discourage private 
investment because they can be seen as sign of economic instability (Hansson & Olofsdotter 
 
9 In line with Razin and Sadka’s (2007) model, we assume that the host country’s tax rate is important for the 
magnitude of FDI flows, whereas the source country’s tax rate is not (i.e. we do not consider tax rate differentials 
between countries). This assumption is also in accordance with Grubert and Mutti’s (2001) observation that in 
the USA corporate tax payments on repatriated income are very small (i.e. less than six percent). 
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2013; Abbas & Klemm 2013). Trade openness, on the other hand, is expected to foster private 
investment in general and FDI inflows in specific (Van Parys & James, 2010). Government 
spending proxies the revenue necessities of governments, their productive investment (which 
can foster investment) and potential crowding-out effects (Mendoza et al., 1997; Romero-
Avila & Strauch, 2008). Last but not least, the quality of institutions is proxied by WGI’s 
rule of law index. It has been widely shown that institutions that protect investors are 
important determinants to foster domestic and foreign investment (see, for example, La Porta 
et al., 1997; Haggard et al., 2008; Lysandrou et al., 2016). 
The use of backward looking ETR implies a potential endogeneity issue, given that 
investments in period t can generate lower tax payments in the periods t+n (for instance due 
to tax allowance for deprecation) (Devereux, 2007; Egger et al., 2009). Moreover, effective 
tax rates are not likely to be exogenous because governments can increase or decrease the 
tax burden according to the observed investment behavior. Finally, there also exist potential 
reverse causation issues with the other explanatory variables: private investment is likely to 
foster economic growth and to influence to some degree government expenditure, inflation, 
trade openness and the quality of institutions. 
In line with recent articles on the subject (Klemm & Van Parys, 2012; Abbas & Klemm, 
2013; Lim, 2014), Blundell and Bond’s (1995) system GMM estimator is used to overcome 
these potential endogeneity issues. System GMM uses the combination of lagged first 
differences to instrument levels and lagged levels to instrument current differences. To limit 
the number of instruments we restrict the lags to two years. Another issue is that investment 
and profits are likely to be affected by the economic cycle. To smooth this effect three-year 
averages are used in the regressions. This approach has the additional advantage that it 
increases the efficiency of the system GMM estimator, which is designed for datasets with a 
relatively small 𝐸𝐸 and large 𝑁𝑁. 
4. Results 
4.1 The magnitude of average backward looking effective corporate tax rates (ECTR) 
Table 2 shows the average CIT and ECTR for the period 1995-2014, and each country’s 
ECTR of the first three years and the last three years for which data are available. As 
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expected, we find that in most cases our calculated effective corporate tax rates are much 
lower than the statutory ones (at least in the countries with available CIT data). To be more 
precise, the average ECTR during the whole period is 17.5%, whereas the average CIT is 
approximately 29%.  
The results also indicate that the sample countries are quite heterogeneous with regard to 
their effective corporate tax burden. In general, high-income countries have generally lower 
rates (mean 16.5%) than upper-middle (mean 17.5%) and lower-middle (mean 19.3%) 
income countries. In specific, China (43.7%) has the highest ECTR while Kuwait’s effective 
tax burden is close to cero (0.7%). Other countries that have low ECTR are Turkey (7.9), 
Mexico (8.6%), Germany (10.4%), Switzerland (11.3%), and Ireland (12%), while Nigeria 
(35.5%), Sweden (31%), Luxembourg (26.4%), Norway (26%) and France (25.9%) are 
among the countries with a relatively high ECTR. 
The table furthermore shows that the dynamics of the ECTR are also quite distinct: 38 
countries have a lower ECTR in the last than in the first observation period, while 35 have a 
higher one, with the most extreme cases Kyrgyzstan (-40 percentage points) and Bolivia (+20 
percentage points). These figures suggest that in many countries the ECTR had different 
movements than the CIT. While most countries have substantially reduced their statutory 
corporate tax rates during the last two decades (Abbas and Klemm, 2013; Dyreng et. al., 
2017), the same is not generally visible for the ECTR; this is especially true for high-income 
countries, where the mean ECTR in the first and last period is nearly identical (16.3% vs. 
16.2%).  
The discrepancy in the developments of CIT and ECTR suggests that governments that 
lowered their CIT at the same time removed/lowered tax incentives and/or loopholes in the 
corporate tax legislations. This probably also partly explain why Devereux et al. (2002) and 
Abbas & Klemm (2013) find that, despite substantial reductions of CIT, corporate tax 





Table 2: Average statutory and effective corporate tax rates in 73 countries 















Argentina 34.3 25.9 21.9 30.5 Ivory Coast  23.1 25.1 21.2 
Armenia  12.5 19.2 13.3 Korea 27.7 12.4 12.5 12.2 
Aruba  14.4 13.4 15.3 Kuwait  0.7 1.0 0.4 
Austria 29.3 17.0 17.9 18.2 Kyrgyzstan  24.8 52.9 12.9 
Azerbaijan  8.9 9.6 8.7 Latvia  10.3 16.6 8.2 
Bahrain  3.5 3.6 3.5 Lithuania  5.9 7.5 4.5 
Belarus  24.2 27.8 16.8 Luxembourg 32.7 26.4 27.5 20.4 
Belgium 36.3 17.0 16.5 17.7 Mexico 31.7 8.6 8.0 9.4 
Bolivia  14.5 6.0 24.7 Mongolia  14.6 16.8 12.5 
Brazil 34.5 23.6 20.3 26.1 Morocco  18.8 15.3 20.2 
Bulgaria  13.1 24.3 9.8 Netherlands 30.3 12.9 15.6 10.2 
Burk. Faso  17.6 16.9 18.4 Nicaragua  23.1 19.5 27.6 
Cameron  17.3 17.9 14.6 Niger  35.5 33.0 26.9 
Cape Verde  14.9 14.5 15.0 Norway 27.9 26.0 21.3 22.4 
Chile 18.0 15.6 15.5 16.4 Peru  16.3 16.8 15.6 
China  43.7 38.6 48.3 Poland 25.2 17.8 28.6 11.7 
Colombia  21.0 17.9 23.9 Portugal 32.4 18.2 16.5 18.4 
Costa Rica  16.8 16.0 17.7 Qatar  24.8 24.9 23.2 
Croatia 20.0 14.1 14.6 14.4 Romania 16.8 15.0 29.1 9.6 
Cyprus  26.7 16.8 31.5 Russia  25.9 35.1 15.6 
Czech Rep. 27.1 13.6 15.5 11.7 Saudi Arabia  38.7 32.3 41.6 
Denmark 28.6 16.1 14.9 16.9 Serbia  20.9 45.2 14.1 
Dom. Rep.  6.6 6.6 6.6 Slovakia 22.6 15.3 10.4 12.4 
Ecuador  11.4 10.7 12.8 Slovenia 26.0 15.2 20.9 15.4 
Egypt  18.9 17.9 21.0 South Africa 36.6 22.8 18.0 23.7 
Estonia 23.7 7.2 10.3 7.2 Spain 38.4 16.0 17.1 12.3 
Finland 26.1 13.6 12.2 12.0 Sweden 26.8 31.0 26.7 31.6 
France 36.2 25.9 24.0 28.7 Switzerland 23.5 11.3 9.4 12.1 
Germany 39.7 10.4 11.4 11.0 Tunisia  16.6 14.4 22.0 
Greece 30.9 19.3 14.4 25.6 Turkey  7.9 7.8 7.4 
Guatemala  7.7 7.5 8.5 UK 29.1 19.5 17.4 18.4 
Honduras  23.2 14.9 28.3 Ukraine  30.7 58.4 22.3 
Hungary 19.7 11.9 12.8 11.8 USA 40.5 18.3 19.6 17.1 
Iceland 22.5 17.9 16.1 22.2 Venezuela  16.7 24.0 17.6 
India 35.8 13.8 14.0 13.6 Virgin Isl.  12.6 13.4 11.7 
Iran  6.6 7.2 5.5 Mean high-income 16.5 16.3 16.2 
Ireland 11.5 12.0 14.1 8.9 Mean upper-middle 17.5 20.0 16.7 
Italy 37.9 18.4 16.9 19.5 Mean lower-middle 19.3 21.4 19.0 
     Total 17.5 18.5 17.0 
Note: Columns 2 and 7 show the average statutory corporate tax rates (CIT) between 1995-2014, Columns 3 
and 8 the average effective corporate tax rates (ECTR) between 1995-2014, Columns 4 and 9 the ECTR in the 
first year where data is available, and Columns 5 and 10 the ECTR in the last year where data is available. 
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4.2 The impact of ECTR on private investment 
Graph 1 shows a scatter plot of the ECTR and FDI inflows and the ECTR and PGFCF. 
Especially in the case of FDI inflows, the plot shows no clear correlation between the two 
variables. In the case of PGFCF, the linear adjustment suggests a slight negative relationship 
(i.e. higher ECTR lead to lower PGFCF); however, the distribution of the observations is 
quite disperse and does not reveal any clear pattern. 
Graph 1: Correlation between ECTR and FDI inflows and PGFCF 
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Next, we procced with the econometric exercise discussed above. In line with Graph 1, 
we do not find any evidence that lower ECTR foster FDI inflows. This finding is robust when 
no control variables are included in the regression (regression (1)), when one controls for 
GDP growth, GDP per capita and inflation (regression (2)), and when one additionally 
considers trade openness, government expenditure and the rule of law (regression (3)). 
Hence, our results add support to those studies that do not find a robust generalized 
significant negative effect of the tax burden on inward direct investment (like Buettner & 
Ruf, 2007; Hansson & Olofsdotter, 2012; Abbas & Klemm, 2013). 
The main variables that seem to explain differences in FDI inflows are GDP growth, trade 
openness and the rule of law. This finding is in line with theory, and previous empirical 
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evidence, that higher (lower) growth rates influence positively (negatively) the expectations 
and confidence of firms, that the level of trade openness is important for their direct 
investment decisions, and that institutions are a key variable to make a country attractive for 
foreign firms.  
Moreover, GDP per capita is weakly significant in regression (3); its negative impact 
might be explained by higher labor costs and lower capital returns of countries with a 
relatively high capital stock. In general, it is line with the empiric phenomena that developing 
countries accounted for a growing share of FDI inflows during the last two decades 
(UNCTAD, 2018). 
Table 3: The impact of effective corporate tax rates on private investment 
 FDI inflows (% of GDP) PGFCF (% of GDP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Investmentt-1 0.091 0.081 0.001 0.934*** 0.698*** 0.624*** 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) 
ECTRt-1 0.113 0.074 0.140 -0.122* -0.041 -0.054 
(0.22) (0.16) (0.18) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
GDP growth  0.536* 0.469**   0.505*** 0.417*** 
 (0.29) (0.23)   (0.07) (0.08) 
GDP pc  0.978 -2.254*   -0.582 -1.464* 
 (1.56) (1.26)   (0.38) (0.86) 
Inflation  -0.032 -0.028   0.017 0.015 
 (0.07) (0.06)   (0.02) (0.02) 
Trade Open.   0.050**    0.001 
  (0.02)    (0.01) 
Gov. Expend.   -0.195    -0.117 
  (0.33)    (0.15) 
Rule of Law   2.920***    0.994 
  (0.97)    (0.87) 
No. Obs. 331 328 328 318 315 315 
No. countries 72 71 71 70 68 68 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include an unreported constant, and the FDI 
regressions include an unreported dummy to control for the atypically high FDI flows to Luxembourg in the 
year 2011 (250% of GDP).  
The results of the private gross fixed capital formation regressions are similar. While 
regression (4), shows weak evidence for a negative impact on ECTR on investment, this 
impact vanishes when the control variables are considered. That is to say, in line with the 
majority of previous cross-country studies, we do not find a robust significant effect of the 
corporate tax burden on PGFCF.  
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In line with the FDI regressions, GDP growth is highly significant to explain private fixed 
capital formation, whereas GDP per capita is negative and only weakly significant. 
Moreover, the lag of PGFCF is highly significant and positive, which implies that it is 
important to consider the persistence of investment spending when studying the drivers of 
private capital formation. Like the growth rate, this finding most likely is related to the animal 
spirits of firms. 
 
4.3 Robustness check with other tax measures 
To check the robustness of our results, we next corroborate if the main findings change 
when the widely used EATR and CIT data from Devereux (obtained from the CBT Tax 
Database) is considered instead of the ECTR. Unfortunately, the CBT Tax Database only 
covers OECD and G20 countries; therefore, this robustness check is limited to 25 countries 
that are nearly all located in the high-income category (see Appendix for the country list). 
In the case of FDI inflows, we find that for the reduced sample size the sign of the ECTR 
variable becomes negative and significant at the 5%-level (Table 4, regression (1) and (4)). 
However, the EATR and the CIT measures have a positive sign, and the former is significant. 
This is to say, that standard tax measures do not reveal any evidence that the tax burden has 
a negative impact on direct investment inflows, while the contrary is true for our measure in 
the reduced sample size. The only other explanatory variable that is significant is the lag of 
FDI inflows (with the expected positive sign).  
With regard to capital formation, the reduced sample size allows us to consider corporate 
gross fixed capital formation (instead of PGFCF). However, in line with the results from 
Table 3, Table 5 does not show any evidence that a reduction of the corporate tax burden 
fosters the physical formation of capital. On the contrary, as in the case of FDI inflows, the 
EATR and CIT have an unexpected positive sign. Hence, again corporate investment rather 
seems to be related with GDP growth, the persistence of investment, trade openness and the 




Table 4: The impact of distinct tax measures on FDI inflows to OECD countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FDIt-1 
0.427* 0.470** 0.464** 0.403* 0.350 0.393* 
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
ECTRt-1 
-0.449**   -0.601**   
(0.21)   (0.25)   
EATRt-1 
 0.236**   0.253*  
 (0.10)   (0.14)  
CITt-1 
  0.163*   0.107 
  (0.08)   (0.07) 
GDP growth 
   0.366 0.418 0.424 
   (0.37) (0.33) (0.35) 
GDP pc 
   5.410 5.671 3.977 
   (5.90) (5.08) (4.43) 
Inflation 
   0.503 0.544 0.420 
   (0.51) (0.48) (0.44) 
Trade Open. 
   -0.025 0.053 0.035 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Gov. Expend. 
   0.079 0.067 -0.046 
   (0.58) (0.56) (0.50) 
Rule of Law 
   -0.213 -1.731 -0.523 
   (3.51) (3.02) (2.57) 
No. Obs. 134 134 134 134 134 134 
No. countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 
 
Table 5: The impact of distinct tax measures on corporate GFKF in OECD countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CGFKFt-1 
0.345* 0.409** 0.323** 0.475*** 0.483*** 0.495*** 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) 
ECTRt-1 
-0.026   0.030   
(0.11)   (0.05)   
EATRt-1 
 0.085***   0.097**  
 (0.03)   (0.04)  
CITt-1 
  0.116***   0.070** 
  (0.03)   (0.03) 
GDP growth 
   0.231** 0.204** 0.205** 
   (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
GDP pc 
   -2.749* -2.401 -2.440 
   (1.44) (1.64) (1.58) 
Inflation 
   0.071 0.097 0.078 
   (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
Trade Open. 
   0.009 0.016** 0.015** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Gov. Expend. 
   -0.196* -0.083 -0.140 
   (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Rule of Law 
   2.548** 1.923* 2.163** 
   (1.00) (1.02) (0.96) 
No. Obs. 135 135 135 135 135 135 
No. countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper proposes a new backward-looking effective corporate tax measure that relies 
on national accounts profit and tax payment data of financial and non-financial corporations, 
and is applicable to a broad sample of developing and developed countries. The proposed 
measure shows that in most cases effective corporate tax rates are much lower than the 
statutory ones, that the effective corporate tax burden of countries is quite heterogeneous, 
and that it had different movements than statutory corporate tax rates. While most countries 
have substantially reduced their statutory corporate tax rates during the last two decades, the 
same is not generally visible for the proposed effective tax measure (especially in the case of 
high-income countries). 
With regard to the impact of the tax burden on investment, our dynamic panel models do 
not show evidence that the effective corporate tax burden was an important determinant for 
FDI inflows or private gross fixed capital formation across developed and developing 
countries in the period 1995-2014. We do however find some evidence that lower effective 
corporate tax rates might attract FDI inflows to OECD countries; but, this finding is not 
robust when alternative tax measures are used that are standard in the literature.  
That is to say, the results suggest that the conventional wisdom that lower corporate taxes 
foster private investment cannot be generalized across countries; probably because in the 
recent era of financialisation profits often are used for financial investment, mergers and 
acquisitions, debt reductions or share buy-backs instead of capital formation. Variables that 
are better predictors of private investment are economic growth, the persistence of investment 
spending, trade openness, and the quality of institutions. 
This finding is important insofar as the lowering of taxes and the use of tax incentives can 
imply important costs for countries. Not only in terms of foregone revenue but also in terms 
of welfare costs through the inefficient allocation of capital. Hence, it seems important to 
study the potential impacts of corporate tax reforms and tax incentives on a case-by-case 
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A. Sample Country list 
High Income 
Aruba, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, Virgin Islands. 
 
Upper-Middle Income 
Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, 




Armenia, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameron, Cape Verde, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, India, 
Ivory Coast, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Tunisia, Ukraine. 
 
Reduced Sample Size 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, UK, USA. 
